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The political sensitivity and growing informalisation of EU asylum governance has
only increased the importance of the role that non-majoritarian institutions such
as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) play in it. Yet, a systematic analysis of the
Court’s jurisprudence casts doubts onto its ability to remain immune to the shifts in
(con)temporary political winds blowing through the Union.
In fact, an empirical study of all asylum-related preliminary rulings reveals a
disquieting trend: the Court has adopted an administrative, passivist role within the
area. Its distinguishing features include an overzealous concern for the technicalities
of the legislative instruments before it and sparse to no references to human rights
instruments or values in the operative parts of the judgments. In light of the symbolic
power carried by the Court’s language, this trend risks sending the wrong signal to
national judicial instances; namely, that concerns for the system can legitimately
trump concerns for the individuals caught in it.
Empirical Evidence of the Court’s Preoccupation
with Technicalities
As of September 2020, the European Court of Justice has delivered precisely 89
preliminary rulings on asylum matters. Those seek to clarify the ambiguity of the
legislative instruments governing the area, itself a direct consequence of the ‘broad
Brussels compromise’ necessary to adopt them in the first place. In a total of 22
of those cases, the Court rationalises its decision by relying on the principle of
preserving the ‘effectiveness’ of the asylum system or the regulation in question.
In other words, the Court resorts to that principle in one out of four cases, making
it a leitmotif in its asylum jurisprudence. What is more, the very same cases also
serve as evidence that, more often than not, human rights considerations are
largely absent from the Court’s language if the EU asylum system appears to be
in jeopardy. In those instances, the opportunities to appeal to human rights are
substituted by recurrent calls to discern the ‘intention of the EU legislature’ and
consider the ‘objective/purpose/function of the instrument’ in question when making
a decision – cues which allow the Court to appear objective and technical in its
application of the law.
The phenomenon of sparse to no references to human rights, be they formal or
substantive, is most visible in the Court’s Dublin Regulation-related judgments. In
them, the ECJ is so determined to preserve the effectiveness of the asylum system
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that the principle will almost definitely outweigh any competing rationales in the
Court’s reasoning. In fact, despite a history of serving as the Court’s go-to measure
for an expansive interpretation of the rights afforded to EU citizens in the process of
EU integration, the principle of ‘effectiveness’ has the opposite effect on the rights of
third country nationals within the area of asylum. Perhaps most surprisingly, neither
the Treaties, nor the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the
Charter) are used much in the Court’s interpretation of secondary legislation. In fact,
the average asylum case before the Court is more likely to refer to the remarks made
during the drafting of an instrument in the form of the travaux préparatoires than it is
to the Charter, which is codified law of constitutional standing. Yet, despite what the
continued repetition of references to the principle of ‘effectiveness’, the ‘intention of
the legislature’ and the ‘objective of the instrument’ in the process of interpretation
would have you believe, the task of resolving the ambiguity inherent in the legislation
governing the asylum sphere is far from simple.
Legislative Ambiguity that is Not Resolvable by the
Mechanical Application of the Law
It is no secret that the policy objectives characterising immigration and asylum law
following the Treaty of Lisbon have a conflicting nature. Understandably, reconciling
the abolition of borders within the Schengen area with the need to combat illegal
immigration, whilst also upholding the principle of non-refoulement, is no easy task.
Quite the contrary, pursuing those goals simultaneously has often led to clashing
Union policies, as a result of which its behaviour has been described as ‘organised
hypocrisy’. Rather than help clarify the meaning of vague legislative instruments
governing the area, this context exacerbates the difficulty inherent in discerning their
‘objective/function/purpose’ with certainty. This context sheds a new light on the
scarce references to human rights principles in the decisions themselves. If applying
the law was not the simple exercise all the technical language would have one
believe it to be, but instead a difficult balancing act between the conflicting values
undergirding the system, then the Court’s transformation into an administrative
tribunal within asylum (unlike in other spheres where it takes on a more constitutional
role) was not an inevitable phenomenon, but a choice. This leaves one important
question pending – if resolving the ambiguity of a case is much more complex than
the mechanical application of the law, then why are human rights considerations
absent so often in the Court’s reasoning? The answer might lie in the historical
development of the Court’s mandate over the area and its growing informalisation.
Reintroducing the Relevance of the Court’s
Complicated History with the Subject of Asylum
The political sensitivity of asylum governance in the EU has always been a
thorn in the side of the European Court of Justice, starting with the area’s slow
communitarisation and moving onto its rather late inclusion into the Court’s
jurisdiction as a result thereof. Today, years after the Court was granted the long-
awaited mandate to adjudicate on asylum matters, the process of informalisation
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is once again placing important asylum governance decisions beyond the Court’s
jurisdiction. Complicated by the history that precedes it, this process leaves the
institution in a difficult predicament. On the one hand, the gradual shift towards
informality in EU asylum governance leaves individuals affected by the relevant
instruments without recourse to legal protection. This underscores the urgency of
having an international court of its standing to rule on a subject matter that is often
described as an ‘orphan issue’ in international law and for it to do so in a manner that
reiterates the paramount importance of upholding human rights principles.
On the other hand, the political unrest within the area means that the ECJ cannot
risk alienating EU Member States by remaining indifferent to their concerns. This
might be the reason behind the Court’s efforts to portray itself as a mechanical
arbitrator of the law, who follows the ‘intention of the legislature’ and seeks to
preserve the ‘effectiveness’ of the asylum system. The Court’s technical language
therefore reaffirms its sensitivity to the political struggles facing the European Union.
This is especially true in controversial spheres such as asylum, where it is forced
to fight for the preservation of the asylum system on terms more complex than the
ones faced by the Union’s political institutions. Whilst for the latter, the increasingly
obvious unsustainability of the asylum system in its current form has activated
heated debates and new diplomatic manoeuvres, for the European Court of Justice,
the inconclusive and prolonged nature of these debates has translated into a daily
existential struggle of applying rules that are no longer fit for purpose. Finding ways
to do so until legislative change takes place seems to have been at the source of the
Court’s technical approach. Its message to the Union is firm: change should occur
at the legislative level. The longer that takes, the greater the threat to the human
rights of the individuals caught in the system because of the need for the Court to
concentrate its efforts on preserving the ‘effectiveness’ of the system.
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